

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR 1 Oct 53

20 September 1953

NSC

THE OUTLOOK FOR COMPLETING RATIFICATION OF THE EDC TREATY

A. Summary of the Present Situation

France

- The French situation, which looks markedly better than four weeks ago, continues to be the crux of the whole problem.

I will return to this in a moment.

West Germany

- Both houses of parliament ratified last spring.
- Constitutional Court now deliberating the legality of both Bonn and Paris treaties^{es}, but generally expected to follow the 6 September election returns.
- If not, Adenauer can probably muster a two-thirds majority for the necessary modifications of the constitution.
- Lower house ratified by two-thirds majority in July.

Netherlands

- Upper house may take its time, but its final approval is generally expected, possibly by the end of the year.

Belgium

- Both houses expected to make EDC the first order of business when they reconvene - lower house on 6 October, upper house in November.

DOCUMENT NO. 11
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 11
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE
AUTH: 1-286
DATE: 1-286
REVIEWER: []

DOCUMENT NO. 11
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 11
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE
AUTH: 1-286
DATE: 1-286
REVIEWER: []

State Department review(s) completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sket

~~TOP SECRET~~

- Final approval not considered in doubt

and Belgian government believes this
may be attained in 1953.

Luxembourg

- Approval expected to follow Belgium's

Italy

- The one country where prospects now
look actually worse than they did last
spring, when De Gasperi promised to push
the treaty through parliament this year.

- Several reasons for this decline in ratifi-
cation prospects:

(1) De Gasperi's poor showing in the June
elections was widely attributed to his
previous close cooperation on US-
sponsored policies.

(2) The present Pella government is only
a provisional one



25X6

25X6

(3) Trieste has become an even more burning
issue with Italian public.

Pella told Ambassador Luce on 3
September that a favorable solution
was now a precondition for Italian
EDC ratification.

(4) And finally, similar public pressures
are building up against ~~any~~ any
measures risking war and against further

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

postponement of domestic reforms.

These pressures are already being manifested in a growing lack of co-operativeness in Italy's relation with us.

- Hence a date for EDC debate is not even being discussed at this time.
- But Italy seems to recognize that European integration is to its long term interest, economically and defense-wise; it is already a member of the Coal-Steel Community.
- Hence Italy not likely to be hold-out once the other participating countries have all ratified.

B. To return to the more ~~with~~ critical problem in France:

German elections
of 6 Sep a turn-
ing point

- The shift of French government policy in the second half of September was striking.

Before German
elections, a
black picture

- ~~The~~ Laniel government was committed to no schedule on EDC ratification
- Foreign Minister Bidault appeared under the influence of elements tending to retard rather than promote integration.
- The enemies of EDC were organizing an aggressive opposition

~~TOP SECRET~~

Almost ~~unopposed~~ by the treaty's supporters

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100090018-8

- France and Germany seemed deadlocked on the Saar.

Previous Mayer government had made a settlement a firm condition for French ratification of EDC

- Worst of all, the French public seemed in a psychological rut on the subject of EDC, apparently accepting the argument that

Before they could bind themselves more closely to the Germans, the French must regain a position of strength

Hence Germany's growing ^{economic} ~~strength~~ predominance made the French fret over their financial and trade difficulties, the drain of the Indochina war, and the challenge to their position in North Africa

In addition they saw a possibility of American defense economies making the US less reliable as a stabilizing force in Europe.

- On 9 September, Under Secretary of State Maurice Schumann told Ambassador Dillon with enthusiasm -

The elections had provided "a much needed shock for French public opinion," and

Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100090018-8

change of
atmosphere
after 6 Sept.

~~TOP SECRET~~

On 15 September Bidault assured

Dillon that, given a Saar settlement-

He was now convinced France would

ratify EDC before the end of the

year, and

He was "prepared to devote his full

time to accomplishing this result"

- Dillon commented:

"This position by Bidault is a dramatic change of front. While he has always maintained his support for EDC, he has never before given a date for ratification."

- On 17 September Dillon noted that there was now

"keen competition between Laniel and Bidault as to who can do most to get EDC through."

- On 26 September, Laniel announced publicly that

to
He would ask Parliament to ratify EDC as soon as outstanding differences with Germany were settled at the anticipated early meeting between Bidault and Adenauer

French ratification now seems to depend on

- (1) An understanding on the Saar
- (2) Satisfying the Socialist Party on

A European Political Community with real supranational powers

(3) Avoidance of a new cabinet
crisis

(4) Coping successfully with up-
setting developments abroad,
e.g., a failure of the Navarre
Plan in Indochina, unforeseen
Soviet initiatives

(To take up these points one by one--)

(1) Prospects for
Saar settlement

- Negotiations, which last spring reached agreement on the principle of "European-izing" the territory, are to be resumed in mid-October.
- Adenauer's electoral victory gives him greater leeway to make concessions on the chief remaining stumbling block--France's economic position in the Saar.

He is already publicly on record as realizing France cannot give this up entirely

(2) Problem of
insuring Social-
ist support

- French*
- Government needs over 300 National Assembly votes to put EDC across there, but can count on only about 250 from the parties in the coalition.

Several ex-Gaullist cabinet members threatened in mid-September to resign

~~TOP SECRET~~

on the European integration issue.

- Government therefore looks to the Socialist party as the most promising source of the needed additional votes
Believes that under proper conditions it can swing about 80 of the 104 deputies of this party.
- The Socialist demands are:
 - (1) Close British "association" with EDC on which London now appears to have satisfied the Socialist party leader.
 - (2) That the proposed Political Community now under international discussion, be given "real" or supranational authority for controlling German power.
- Socialist position therefore now seems to depend on a considerable firming up of the instructions sent to the French delegation now negotiating in Rome
These instructions apparently cannot be clarified without a resolution of the struggle now dividing the French cabinet on the whole question of France's policy on European integration.

~~TOP SECRET~~

**(3) Avoidance of
cabinet crisis**


- ~~TOP SECRET~~**
- Overthrow of the Laniel government would probably mean a prolonged and serious crisis.

Next regime would need time to develop its own strategy on the treaty

- There are various indications that Laniel will stay in power at least till mid-December, but he faces real threats from:

- (1) The persistent budgetary difficulties
- (2) Labor's hostility flaring up in the August strikes and still strong;

25X6A

- 
- Hence EDC ratification will depend also on such developments abroad as

~~TOP SECRET~~

- (1) The fate of the Sauerre plan
in Indochina
- (2) Further Soviet initiatives
toward a dentente in the cold war

In conclusion

- Even if all goes well in the National Assembly, there is one further factor which may delay French ratification until early 1954.

This is the upper house of Parliament which is highly conservative and includes many able critics of the treaty.

Under its prerogatives, it could hold up ratification as long as two months.

Such a further delay might mean a crippling loss of the momentum imparted by the Adenauer victory in September

25X1